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Case No. 20100710-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
LLOYD FRANKLIN VIT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-503 (West 2004); and possession or use of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 
Supp. 2010). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to 
suppress evidence seized from his trailer? 
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed 
question of law and fact. We review the trial court's application of the law to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the facts under a correctness standard. If there are factual findings to review, we 
will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous/' State v. Lenhart, 2011 
UT 27, f 20, 262 P.3d 1. 
2. Whether the trial court plainly erred in not recognizing that 
defendant's trailer was illegally searched and that evidence was illegally seized? 
Standard of Review. "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must 
establish that (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 13,10 
P.3d 346 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision and rule are attached at 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Facts1 
A backhoe was stolen from a company, Staker Parsons. R149:105. The 
owner of the company asked his drivers to "keep an eye out for the backhoe" as 
1
 The facts are recited most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Hamblin, 2010 UT App 239, If 1 n.l, 239 P.3d 300, cert denied, 245 P.3d 757 (Utah 
2010). 
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they made their daily rounds. Id. While driving north on 1-15 near Marriott-
Slaterville, one of the company's drivers saw the backhoe in a field that was next 
to the freeway. Id. at 105,124-25. The driver called his supervisor, who called 
Ogden City Police Officer John Thomas, who, with another officer, went to the 
location. Id. at 104-05. 
Officer Thomas and the other officer saw the backhoe from the freeway. 
Id. at 105. They followed a road to gain access to the field. Id. Finding that the 
gate to the property was locked, they sought out and spoke to a neighbor/who 
told them that the property belonged to Defendant. Id. The officers returned to 
Defendant's property to try to confirm whether the backhoe they had seen from 
the freeway was the stolen equipment. Id. at 106. They climbed over a fence to 
try contact Defendant, but a large, chained-up dog prevented them from 
knocking on the door of a trailer. Id. at 12,106. The officers were unable to get 
anyone to answer the door. Id. However, they were able, however, to view the 
VIN and other identifying marks on the backhoe. Id. at 106. From the 
identifying marks Officer Thomas provided, dispatch confirmed that the 
backhoe was stolen. Id. at 107. 
Another Ogden City Police Officer, Detective Melcher, had arrived on the 
scene, and Officer Thomas asked her to remain at the property to assure that the 
backhoe was not removed while he went to the police station to write a search 
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warrant. Id. Soon after Officer Thomas arrived at the station, he learned that 
Defendant had arrived at his property and had consented to a search of the 
property. Officer Thomas stopped writing the warrant and instead immediately 
returned to the scene. Id. at 107-08. There, the officer asked Defendant if the 
police did, in fact, have his consent to "take a look" at the backhoe, and 
Defendant confirmed his consent. Id. at 108,114. Officer Thomas did not notify 
Defendant that he had previously entered his property. Id. at 104-16. At about 
this time, agents from the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force arrived on the 
scene, including Deputy Steve Haney from the Weber County Sheriff s Office. 
M a t 109,173-74. 
Before the discovery of the stolen backhoe, Deputy Haney had been 
investigating Defendant for narcotics and firearm activity and had asked local 
law enforcement officers "to keep an eye on the property" for any suspicious 
activity that would help develop probable cause for a search warrant. Id. at 175-
76, 179-80. When he received a call informing him that a number of police 
officers were at Defendant's property, Deputy Haney immediately went to the 
scene. Id. at 176. There, he was briefed by Officer Thomas, who also told him 
that Defendant was going to allow detectives onto his property. Id. at 177. 
Deputy Haney explained to Defendant who he and his officers were (they 
typically acted in an undercover capacity — long hair, beards, plain clothes) and 
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why they were there. Id. at 178. Once again, Defendant confirmed that Officer 
Thomas and Deputy Haney could "go ahead/7 and 'Took around/7 Id. The 
officers then followed Defendant to his trailer. Defendant unlocked the door, 
and he and Officer Thomas entered the trailer, in which Defendant lived. Id. at 
178-79. Deputy Haney was "almost instaneousfly]77 called from within the 
trailer. Id. at 179. He walked to the doorway, where he could see firearms and 
paraphernalia "in plain view.77 Id. Deputy Haney told Officer Thomas to "stop 
this right now, I want to get the search warrant and make sure that this thing is 
all aboveboard.77 Id. 
Deputy Haney left the scene and obtained the warrant. Id. at 180. While 
waiting for Deputy Haney to return, none of the officers searched the trailer or 
the backhoe; rather, "all the officers basically stood around/7 just "looking at the 
backhoe.77 Id. at 114-15. Enroute to Defendant's property, Deputy Haney 
immediately called his agents on the scene and told them that he had the 
warrant and directed them to search the trailer. Id. Inside the trailer, agents 
found multiple rifles and handguns, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia. Id. 
at 128-34,148-52,166,169-70,181. 
Deputy Haney did not participate in the search, but instead interviewed 
Defendant away from the trailer. Id. at 181-82. He read Defendant his Miranda 
rights. Id. at 182. Defendant said he understood his rights and was willing to 
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answer questions. Id. In response to the deputy's questions, Defendant said 
that the trailer and all the property within belonged to him, that he was "not 
surprised" by the agents finding methamphetamine, that he had been "a 
constant user of methamphetamine for the last couple of years," and that he had 
last used methamphetamine two days earlier Id. at 182-86. 
The Proceedings Below 
1. Theft by receiving (Case no. 051904751). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to theft by receiving, stemming from the 
discovery on his property of a stolen backhoe on August 29, 2005. R118 at 3-4 
(Presentence investigation report, "PSI"); 144:3. 
2. Possession of firearms by restricted person and possession of 
methamphetamine (Case no. 081901837) - This case. 
After police officers saw firearms and contraband in plain view inside his 
trailer, Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person and possession or use of a controlled substance. Id. Due to delays 
following the death of his retained attorney, the charges were dismissed without 
prejudice. R141:3-4. On August 28, 2008, Defendant was recharged with the 
same two offenses. Rl. Defendant was represented at trial by the public 
defender. R54. The jury convicted Defendant of both offenses. R51-52. The 
trial court sentenced Defendant to statutory zero-to-five-year terms, to be served 
concurrently in the Utah State prison. R120-21. The court suspended the prison 
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terms, placed Defendant on thirty-six months probation, and ordered Defendant 
to serve 120 days in jail, which might alternatively be served in the jail's work 
release/restitution program. R121. Defendant timely appealed. Ril l . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not moving to 
suppress evidence seized from his trailer following an alleged illegal entry onto 
his land to view a stolen backhoe. The claim fails because it is inadequately 
briefed. 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
show that his counsel rendered deficient performance which prejudiced him. 
Where the claim hinges on counsel's failure to raise a Fourth Amendment 
challenge, "the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would 
have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate 
actual prejudice/' Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 
Here, the sum and substance of Defendant's argument is that his trial 
counsel failed to use an alleged suppression motion that his privately retained 
counsel assertedly used to plead his theft by receiving case involving the 
backhoe down from a second-degree felony to a class a misdemeanor. But 
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Defendant does not include the alleged suppression motion in the record on 
appeal or show how a favorable outcome in the backhoe case would be useful in 
suppressing evidence later seized from his trailer in this case. Defendant does 
not analyze whether he actually had an expectation of privacy in the area on 
which the backhoe sat, and he completely disregards that he repeatedly gave 
consent to officers to search his property. Finally, even assuming that there was 
an unlawful entry to search the backhoe, Defendant's does not argue that his 
consent was insufficient to purge the taint of that illegality. This Court should 
summarily reject Defendant's claim. 
II. 
Defendant makes essentially the same claim, above, in the guise of plain 
error: the trial court plainly erred because it failed to recognize that evidence 
seized from the trailer should have been excluded at trial following law 
enforcement's illegal entry onto his land. This claim fails for the same reasons 
recited above. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant claims that his convictions should be reversed because his trial 
counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress incriminating evidence found 
in his trailer after police allegedly entered on his land unlawfully. Aplt. Br. at 
12-20. Alternatively, he claims the trial court plainly erred in not excluding that 
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evidence at trial, based on the same substantive argument. Aplt. Br. at 20-2.7. 
Because Defendant has not addressed the crucial legal issues or developed a 
sufficient record on appeal, he cannot prevail on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY SHOW THAT 
HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS TRAILER 
A. Defendant assumes a heavy burden in proving that his trial 
counsel performed deficiently. 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must meet 
the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient 
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 
(Utah 1996) (citing Strickland V.Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984)). Moreover, 
where a claim of ineffectiveness hinges on counsel's failure to raise a Fourth 
Amendment challenge, "the defendant must also prove that his Fourth 
Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that 
the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to 
demonstrate actual prejudice/7 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) 
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Utah's appellate courts have "consistently required defendants claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel to affirmatively prove both prongs of the 
Strickland test to prevail." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,522 (Utah 1994); accord, 
State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, f 6,131 P.3d 864. As a result, "it is not 
necessary for [the reviewing court] 'to address both components of the inquiry7" 
if it determines that a defendant has made "'an insufficient showing on one/" 
Barnes, 871 P.2d at 523 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); State v. Medina-Juarez, 
2001 UT 79,114,34 P.3d 187 (same). 
Defendant also bears the burden of assuring that "the record is adequate." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,f16,12 P.3d 92. As a result, "an appellate court 
will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported 
by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at t 17. 
"Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding 
that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant: must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action /might be 
considered sound trial strategy/" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). 
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This standard is appropriately deferential, recognizing the 'Variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant/' State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 
1250,1254 (Utah 1993). This deference also recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later 
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of 
materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing 
counsel, and with the judge/7 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) 
(observing that it is "'all too tempting7 to 'second-guess counsel's assistance 
after conviction or adverse sentence," quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). 
Thus, any conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions defeats a 
claim of deficient performance. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 7,89 P.3d 162; 
State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426,-158,61 P.3d 291. Because he bears the burden, 
Defendant must "persuad[e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis 
for counsel's actions." Clark, 2004 UT 25,1 6 (emphasis in original) (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
Defendant must ultimately demonstrate that "counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (quotations 
and citation omitted). The ultimate "question is whether an attorney's 
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representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, 
not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom/' Id. at 788. 
B. Because Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, Defendant 
has not met his burden to show that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently in not moving to suppress evidence seized from his 
trailer following an alleged illegal entry onto his land. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel's performance was deficient 
because he did not move to suppress incriminating evidence seized from his 
trailer as "fruit of the poisonous tree" stemming from Officer Thomas's 
allegedly illegal entry onto his land. Aplt. Br. at 15-17, 27-29. In making this 
argument, Defendant baldly asserts, without analysis, citation to relevant 
authority, or record support, that Officer Thomas's entry plainly and necessarily 
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was made without a warrant or 
"reasonable suspicion" and "exigent circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 12, 23-26." 
Because this claim is inadequately briefed, Defendant fails to sustain his heavy 
burden to show that his counsel performed deficiently. 
"It is well established that Utah appellate courts will not consider claims 
that are inadequately briefed." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, | 8, 52 P.3d 
2
 Defendant expressly incorporates facts and arguments at Points II and 
III of his brief—plain error and expectation of privacy — to more fully articlulate 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. at 20. Accordingly, the 
State also addresses those facts and arguments in its discussion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. As discussed, however, all of Defendant's arguments are 
inadequately briefed and unsupported by a sufficient record. 
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467). An issue is inadequately briefed "when the overall analysis of the issue is 
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court." State v. Tltomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Honie, 2002 
UT 4, f 67, 57 P.3d 977 ("On appeal, the appellant is required to clearly define 
the issues and provide accompanying argument and authority; a reviewing 
court is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research."), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863, 123 257, 154 
L.Ed.2d 105 (2002). In Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62,194 P.3d 913, the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
founded substantially on mere assertions of "per se" deficient performance and 
made without citation to authority or factual support. Id. at ^ 30-34. This case 
exhibits the same defects. 
Defendant particularly argues that trial counsel had available, but failed 
to use, a motion to suppress filed by his privately-retained counsel in the theft 
by receiving case involving the backhoe. Defendant argues that the motion 
"clearly had merit based upon the State agreeing to reduce a charge from a 
second-degree felony to a class A misdemeanor." Aplt. Br. at 15. This is the 
sum and substance of Defendant argument. It lacks merit for several reasons. 
First, Defendant has failed to bring up the alleged motion to suppress. 
Considering that Defendant's claim is that his trial counsel performed 
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deficiently by not using the alleged suppression motion, Defendant on appeal 
should have included it in a motion for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.3 But he did not. See Litlwrland, 2000 UT 76, H 16 ("If a 
defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination 
that counsel was ineffective/ Utah R. App. P. 23B, defendant bears the primary 
obligation and burden of moving for a temporary re-mand."). Without the 
suppression motion, this Court cannot assess whether a suppression motion 
actually existed, or if it did exist, whether its contents related to Officer 
Thomas's consensual entry into the trailer in this case. Therefore, Defendant has 
failed to develop a record sufficient to show that his counsel was deficient in not 
using a suppression motion allegedly used in another case. 
Second, the court in the backhoe case never ruled that Officer Thomas's 
entry onto Defendant's land violated the Fourth Amendment, R149:120-21, and 
3
 Utah R. App. P. 23B provides: 
(a) Grounds for Motion; Time. A party to an appeal in a criminal 
case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for 
entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's 
determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(b) Content of Motion; Response; Reply.... The motion shall 
include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient 
performance of the attorney. 
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Defendant has entirely failed to brief this issue on appeal. Here, Defendant's 
claims rest upon the simplistic and unbriefed assumption that an officer's 
warrantless entry onto property surrounded by a fence with a locked gate 
automatically violates his reasonable expectation of privacy in an area outside 
his home — the trailer—and in full view of the public. Aplt. Br. at 16-17, 24-25. 
The validity of that assumption, however, is far from clear. See e.g., Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (holding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in "open fields'7 despite fences, gates, locks, and "no trespassing" signs). 
Defendant has cited the "reasonable expectation of Privacy" standard, but has 
engaged in no legal analysis, has cited no authority, and has not otherwise 
explained why his rights were violated under the facts of this case. In short, he 
has not carried his burden to "prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious." Morrison, 4:77 U.S. at 375. Accord, Kell, 2008 UT 62, ^ 30-34 
(unbriefed assertions that counsel's performance fit within recognized categories 
of per se deficient performance or prejudice inadequate to prove ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
Even assuming, arguendo, a sufficient showing that the initial police entry 
onto the lot was unlawful, Defendant must also demonstrate that such entry 
was "at least the 'but for' cause of the discovery of the evidence." Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796,815 (1984). And if he can show that, Defendant must 
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then demonstrate that his subsequent consent to look around did not "purge the 
evidence of any 'taint.'" Id. at 814. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 
1990) (recognizing "Supreme Court expressly declined to hold 'that all evidence 
is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light 
but for the illegal actions of the police/"" citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471,487-88 (1963)). Although Defendant asserts that the evidence is "fruit 
of the poisonous tree," Aplt. Brf. at 12,16-17,23-24,27-29, he engages in no 
analysis demonstrating why this is so. He simply writes, "All of the evidence 
gathered against the Defendant in the present case stems from the initial illegal 
seizure and subsequent search of the Defendant's property." Aplt. Br. 28. Once 
again, therefore, Defendant has not satisfied his burden to "prove that his 
Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious." Morrison, 477 U.S. at 375. 
Indeed, although Defendant grudgingly acknowledges that "Officer 
Thomas stated Defendant consented" to the officer's looking at his "backhoe," 
Aplt. Br. at 10, he fails to mention that he separately gave Deputy Haney his 
consent that officers could "look around" his "property," and that he 
immediately opened his trailer door for Officer Thomas and Deputy Haney. 
R149:178-79. 
Defendant thus does not even consider whether his subsequent consent 
purged any prior taint. See State v. Bisner, 2001UT 99, f 43,37 P.3d 1073 (noting 
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search conducted with consent is "recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement"). This dearth of analysis suggests that Defendant's trial counsel 
recognized that he could not succeed in applying the relevant Fourth 
Amendment doctrines to suppress evidence seized from the trailer, and instead 
chose another strategy. In fact, counsel very deliberately tried to impeach 
Officer Thomas's credibility by trying not to suppress evidence of an alleged 
illegal search, but by suggesting in cross examination and to the court that the 
officer wantonly broke the law. R149:112-13, 118-121. Defendant fails to 
mention trial counsel's impeachment efforts, and thus fails to rebut that counsel 
had "no conceivable tactical basis" for his alternative strategy. Clark, 2004 UT 
25,1 6. 
In sum, because Defendant has failed to analyze the legal substance or 
develop a relevant factual record intrinsic to the claim that his trial counsel 
performed deficiently, defendant's argument on the first Strickland prong fails. 
And because Defendant has failed to show that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently, his claim of ineffective assistance fails entirely. See State v. Alfatlawi, 
2006 UT App 511, t 43,153 P.3d 804 ("Since both prongs of Strickland must be 
satisfied, see State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tf 29,12 P.3d 92, we need not reach 
the prejudice prong, and Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails.") 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT 
RECOGNIZING THAT DEFENDANTS TRAILER WAS 
ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND THAT EVIDENCE WAS 
ILLEGALLY SEIZED 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in not 
recognizing that "his property was searched and seized in an illegal manner 
without Defendant present nor was reasonable suspicion or exigent 
circumstances present." Aplt. Br. at 20, 24. This argument is thus founded on 
the same claim made under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
Officer Thomas illegally entered on his land to examine the backhoe, from 
which flowed all the evidence seized after the search of the trailer. 
Consequently, Defendant's claim of plain error also fails. 
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) [a]n error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in 
the verdict is undermined/" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 13, 10 P.3d 346 
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993). 
Here, as discussed above, Defendant has failed to adequately analyze or 
adduce facts to show that his consent to search his trailer did not purge the taint 
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of any illegal entry. Aple. Br. at I. This Court has repeatedly rejected plain error 
claims where lack of obvious error was evident. See State v. Cooper, 2011 UT 
App 234, % 27, 261 P.3d 653 (holding that legal analysis requiring statutory 
interpretation not raised at trial"makes it clear that any error would not 'have 
been obvious to the trial court"'); State v. Hale, 2005 UT App 305U *1 (holding 
first of two claimed errors that prosecutor breached plea-in-abeyance agreement 
could not have been obvious to trial court because agreement was never put on 
record or otherwise made known to court until after defendant moved to 
withdraw his admission to allegations he violated terms of agreement); State v. 
Jacob, 2005 UT App 112U *l-2 (holding in rape prosecution any error in 
excluding evidence, claimed on appeal to show bias, could not have been 
obvious where evidence offered at trial only to show lack of sexual contact); 
State v, Richins,.'2004 UT App 36, ^  11 n.3,86 P.3d 759 (holding that claimed error 
in plea taking could not have been obvious where claim required hearing and "a 
rather elaborate explanation" before appellate court found it comprehensible). 
Here, the alleged inadmissibility of evidence seized from the trailer could 
not have been obvious to the trial court, given the absence of any legal argument 
concerning the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, requiring detailed argument, 
and given Defendant's repeated consent to officers to 'Took around" his 
property. Lack of obvious error is particularly evident here where Defendant 
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did not use the possibility of Officer Thomas's alleged unlawful entry to 
suppress evidence, but rather to impeach the officer's credibility and the 
prosecution's case. R149:112-13,118-21. Given these circumstances, any alleged 
error in not sua sponte excluding evidence seized from the trailer could not have 
been obvious to the trial court. Thus, Defendant has failed to show that the trial 
court plainly erred in admitting evidence seized from the trailer. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted this <A7 day of December, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. TJRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U.S. Constitutional Amendment IV. Search and Seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
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Utah R. App. P. 23B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY 
TO DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM 
(a) Grounds for Motion; Time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move 
the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, 
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding 
the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim has been 
raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of Motion; Response; Reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall also 
be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim 
to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The response 
shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness 
claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed 
by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the responding party 
accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be filed within 10 
days after the response is served. 
(c) Order of the Court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have 
been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to the trial 
court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the ineffectiveness 
claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed 
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by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to complete the 
proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent 
a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the 
appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel 
withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on Appeal Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated 
upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps 
required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay 
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or upon the 
court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings Before the Trial Court Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings 
of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any 
claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be 
considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court determines that the 
interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not 
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be 
conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The burden of 
proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof 
shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written 
findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and the 
claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order 
of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of 
the order of remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and Transmittal of the Record, At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court 
shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon 
preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings 
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of 
the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon the 
preparation of the entire record. 
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(g) Appellate Court Determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made 
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable 
under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. The findings 
of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as 
the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
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